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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Erik Sherman Trenkle and his significant other, Misty Bacus, were involved in a 
physical altercation that took place in the presence of their minor son, K.T.  After a 
mistrial in his first trial and a hung jury in his second trial, the jury in his third trial found 
Mr. Trenkle guilty of felony domestic violence in the presence of a child.  Mr. Trenkle 
appealed, asserting the district court erred when it denied his request for a defense of 
property jury instruction. 
 In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argued the district court correctly determined 
the evidence did not support a defense of property instruction, and any error in not 
giving a defense of property instruction was harmless.  (Resp. Br., pp.3-10.)  This Reply 
Brief is necessary to address the State’s arguments, which are unavailing. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Trenkle’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Trenkle’s request for an I.C.J.I. 1522 
defense of property jury instruction? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Trenkle’s Request For An I.C.J.I. 1522 
Defense Of Property Jury Instruction 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Idaho law recognizes that, to prevent an illegal attempt by force to take or injure 
property, the person who lawfully possesses the property may use resistance sufficient 
to prevent the offense from occurring.  See State v. Walsh, 141 Idaho 870, 877 
(Ct. App. 2005) (citing I.C. § 19-202).  Mr. Trenkle asserts a reasonable jury could 
conclude from the evidence presented that Ms. Bacus was attempting to injure his cell 
phone, and that he made contact with Ms. Bacus’ forehead while using resistance 
sufficient to prevent that injury to his property from occurring.  Cf. Walsh, 141 Idaho at 
877.  Thus, contrary to the State’s argument, the district court erred when it denied 
Mr. Trenkle’s request for an I.C.J.I. 1522 defense of property jury instruction.  Further, 
the State has failed to prove the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Trenkle’s Request For An I.C.J.I. 
1522 Defense Of Property Jury Instruction 
 
 Mr. Trenkle asserts the district court erred when it denied his request for a 
defense of property jury instruction.   The requested instruction was a correct statement 
of the law and was not adequately covered by other instructions.  Further, the evidence 
presented supported the requested instruction.  Thus, the district court should have 
honored Mr. Trenkle’s request for a defense of property jury instruction.  See State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710-11 (2009). 
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In the Respondent’s Brief, the State has only offered argument disputing whether 
the evidence presented supported the requested instruction.  (See Resp. Br., pp.3-9.)  
As a preliminary matter, the State appears to be confused about the scope of 
Mr. Trenkle’s assertions regarding the evidence in support of the defense of property 
jury instruction.  Mr. Trenkle has asserted the evidence presented supported a 
conclusion by the jury that Ms. Bacus was making an illegal attempt by force to injure 
Mr. Trenkle’s property, and in response Mr. Trenkle used reasonable resistance 
sufficient to prevent the offense that was about to occur.  (See App. Br., pp.13-14; Trial 
Tr., p.268, L.22 – p.269, L.3 (trial counsel asserting Ms. Bacus testified that Mr. Trenkle 
grabbed her “to get the cellphone.”).)  Thus, to the extent the State’s arguments concern 
whether the evidence supported a conclusion that Mr. Trenkle used reasonable 
resistance to prevent Ms. Bacus’ illegal attempt by force to take, as opposed to injure, 
Mr. Trenkle’s property (see Resp. Br., pp.6, 8), those arguments may be disregarded by 
the Court. 
 The State argues Mr. Trenkle’s “use of force was also not ‘reasonably necessary 
to prevent the threatened injury’ to his cellphone.”  (Resp. Br., p.7.)  According to the 
State, Mr. Trenkle could have simply left to prevent Ms. Bacus from throwing the phone, 
and it was not reasonably necessary for him to grab Ms. Bacus around the neck or 
knock her out.  (Resp. Br., p.7.)  This argument by the State improperly invites the Court 
to decide the legal issue on appeal based on questions of fact and thus invade the 
province of the jury.  Whether Mr. Trenkle’s use of force when Ms. Bacus attempted to 
throw the phone was unreasonable, and whether his use of force when she no longer 
had the phone was unreasonable, “are questions of fact which, in a jury trial, are within 
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the province of the jury.”  See State v. Garner, 159 Idaho 896, ___, 367 P.3d 720, 724 
(Ct. App. 2016) (holding, on whether the evidence supported an I.C.J.I. 1263 jury 
instruction on self-defense with respect to officers, that “[w]hether the officers’ use of 
force was excessive and whether [the defendant’s] responding force was unreasonable 
are questions of fact which, in a jury trial, are within the province of the jury.”).  Like the 
Idaho Court of Appeals did in Garner, this Court should reject the State’s invitation to 
“weigh the evidence.”  See id., 367 P.3d at 724. 
 Contrary to the State’s argument, the “primary issue here is whether there was 
some evidence to support” Mr. Trenkle’s requested defense of property jury instruction.  
See id., 367 P.3d at 724.  Based on Ms. Bacus’ testimony (see Trial Tr., p.147, L.8 – 
p.148, L.9, p.197, L.25 – p.198, L.7, p.204, L.10 – p.206, L.1), a reasonable jury could 
have concluded that Ms. Bacus was threatening to injure Mr. Trenkle’s cell phone by 
throwing it out the door, and that Mr. Trenkle’s actions were a reasonable response to 
that potential imminent injury.  Because of the lack of testimony on how much time 
elapsed between Ms. Bacus dropping the phone and Mr. Trenkle making contact with 
Ms. Bacus’ forehead (see Trial Tr., p.148, Ls.10-18, p.150, L.15 – p.152, L.6, p.207, 
L.21 – p.210, L.20), the jury could have concluded Mr. Trenkle contacted Ms. Bacus’ 
forehead immediately after she dropped the phone and did not hear her announce she 
dropped the phone.  Thus, the evidence presented supported Mr. Trenkle’s requested 
defense of property jury instruction, and Mr. Trenkle was entitled to such an instruction. 
 The State attempts to argue its conclusion that Mr. Trenkle was not entitled to a 
defense of property instruction “is consistent with the Court of Appeals’ opinion in 
State v. Walsh, [141 Idaho 870] (Ct. App. 2005)” (Resp. Br., p.7), but the facts in Walsh 
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are readily distinguishable from those in this case.  In Walsh, the victim hid a box of 
documents from the defendant, and the defendant contended he pushed the victim to 
remove her from his path so he could look for the documents.  Walsh, 141 Idaho at 877.  
On appeal, the defendant asserted the magistrate erred by refusing his requested 
defense of property instruction, and the Idaho Court of Appeals held the evidence did 
not support the legal theory of defense of property.  Id. at 876-77.  The Walsh Court 
observed “no evidence suggests that there was an imminent threat that the victim would 
destroy the documents, which could justify resistance to prevent such injury.”  Id. at 877. 
 Conversely, as the State acknowledges (see Resp. Br., pp.5-6), in the instant 
case Ms. Bacus testified that she told Mr. Trenkle she would grab his cell phone and 
throw it out the door if he did not leave, and she then grabbed the phone, ran to the 
front door, and tried to throw the phone out the door.  (See Trial Tr., p.147, L.14 – 
p.148, L.1.)  Thus, unlike the evidence in Walsh, the evidence in this case suggested 
there was an imminent threat that Ms. Bacus would injure the phone, which could justify 
Mr. Trenkle’s resistance to prevent such injury.  Cf. Walsh, 141 Idaho at 877.  Walsh 
does not support the State’s argument, because the facts in that case are readily 
distinguishable from the facts here. 
 The evidence presented supported Mr. Trenkle’s requested I.C.J.I. 1522 defense 
of property jury instruction.  The district court erred when it denied his request for a 
defense of property instruction.  As shown above, the State’s arguments to the contrary 
are unavailing.   
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C. The State Has Failed To Prove That The District Court’s Failure To Give 
Mr. Trenkle’s Requested Defense Of Property Jury Instruction Is Harmless 
Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
 
Mr. Trenkle asserts the State has failed to prove that the district court’s failure to 
give his requested instruction is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). 
Mr. Trenkle would first note the State urges the Court to use the wrong harmless 
error standard in this case.  The State contends “[a]n instructional error is harmless 
where it is ‘clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the 
defendant guilty absent the error.’”  (Resp. Br., p.9 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1, 18 (1999)).  But the Idaho Supreme Court has explained that “[w]here the jury 
reached its verdict based upon erroneous instruction an appellate court shall generally 
vacate and remand the decision of the lower court.”  Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.  The Perry 
Court continued: “However, in the limited instance where the jury received proper 
instruction on all but one element of an offense, and ‘[w]here a reviewing court 
concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and 
supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the 
same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly found to be harmless.’”  Id. 
(quoting State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 73, 79 (2004)).   
Mr. Trenkle’s case does not involve the “limited instance” from Perry.  In the 
present case, the jury instructions did not omit an element of an offense, but rather the 
jury did not receive proper instruction on a defense.  (See, e.g., App. Br., pp.10-14.)  
Thus, the harmless error standard invoked by the State is not applicable here.  See 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.  The State in this case “has the burden of demonstrating to the 
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appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional violation did not 
contribute to the jury’s verdict.”  See id. at 227-28.  Put otherwise, the issue “is not what 
effect the constitutional error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable 
jury, but rather what effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand.”  See 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993). 
The State argues the Court “can easily conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 
that, had the jury been given the defense of property instruction, it still would have 
found” Mr. Trenkle guilty because his acts “were not reasonably necessary to prevent 
the threatened harm to his cellphone.”  (Resp. Br., p.9.)  This argument by the State is 
unavailing because it uses the wrong harmless error standard and, for the reasons set 
forth in Part B. above, improperly invites the Court to invade the province of the jury. 
The State additionally argues it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury 
would have found Mr. Trenkle guilty absent the error because Mr. Trenkle’s conduct 
after the incident “revealed that his violent acts were not to protect his phone, but were 
the result of rage.”  (See Resp. Br., p.9.)  This argument also fails because it uses the 
wrong harmless error standard.   
Further, the defense of property jury instruction provides, as the State recognizes 
(see Resp. Br., p.4), that “[r]easonableness is to be judged from the viewpoint of a 
reasonable person placed in the same position and seeing and knowing what the 
defendant then saw and knew.”  I.C.J.I. 1522; cf. State v. Mason, 111 Idaho 660, 670 
(Ct. App. 1986) (“We conclude that any threat to Mason had subsided when Stapleton 
left his presence.  Thus, Mason was not ‘about to be injured’ and lawful resistance was 
unnecessary.”).  The jury therefore could have found that any battery committed by 
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Mr. Trenkle was, at the time, “reasonably necessary to prevent the threatened injury” 
based on “the viewpoint of a reasonable person placed in the same position and seeing 
and knowing what [Mr. Trenkle] then saw and knew,” irrespective of Mr. Trenkle’s future 
conduct.1  See I.C.J.I. 1522. 
The State has failed to prove that the district court’s failure to give his requested 
instruction is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.  Thus, 
Mr. Trenkle’s conviction should be vacated and the case should be remanded for a new 
trial.  See State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 472 (2012).   
 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief, 
Mr. Trenkle respectfully requests this Court vacate his conviction and remand his case 
to the district court for a new trial. 
 DATED this 24th day of May, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
                                            
1 For example, the court minutes for Day 3 of Mr. Trenkle’s second trial state the jury 
was given the full I.C.J.I. 1522 defense of property jury instruction in response to a jury 
question.  (R., p.199.)  After the jury received the defense of property instruction, it was 
unable to reach a verdict.  (R., p.199.)   
Mr. Trenkle asserts the result of the second trial indicates at least one juror in 
that trial was concerned whether Mr. Trenkle’s actions were justifiable as defense of 
property.  Cf. State v. Thomas, 157 Idaho 916, ___, 342 P.3d 628, 631-32 (2015) 
(holding the State failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
constitutional error in excluding proffered evidence that would have corroborated the 
defendant’s testimony did not affect the jury’s verdict, where a jury question “indicates 
that at least one juror was concerned whether there was any evidence to corroborate 
Defendant’s testimony.”) 
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